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Abstract
In Part I, this Article examines legal responses to crimes against humanity during World War I
and World War II. Part II considers the various sources of international law that recognized crimes
against humanity prior to World War I. In Part III, this Article examines Canada’s assertion of
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. This Article concludes that those who have committed
crimes against humanity during World War II must be punished in order to deter the commission
of crimes against humanity in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
World War I was a premonition of World War II. The
combatants were, by and large, the same, the quarrels were
similar, and even the wartime atrocities bore a haunting resem-
blance to each other. World War I saw the Armenian massa-
cre-the Turkish murder of hundreds of thousands of Arme-
nian men, women, and children and the attempt to extermi-
nate all Armenians within the boundaries of the Ottoman
empire.' World War II saw the Holocaust-the Nazi extermi-
nation of approximately six million Jews and the attempt to
exterminate even more.2
The responses to the two genocides also began in the
same way. As the atrocities became known, the victors in both
wars stated that they would punish the perpetrators. Yet, no
assertive legal action was taken in the aftermath of World War
I. It was not until after World War II that the international
community united in condemning crimes against humanity.
These crimes had been tolerated through lack of prosecution
throughout history. The lesson learned is that unless crimes
against humanity are vigorously prosecuted they are destined
to be repeated. In Part I, this Article examines legal responses
t This Article was prepared from a speech delivered by the author in March
1989 at the Conference on the Prosecution of Massive Human Rights Violations
sponsored by the Program in International Law and Human Rights of Cardozo
School of Law in cooperation with the New School for Social Research and the
Boston College Law School Holocaust and Human Rights Research Project.
* B.A., Juris. (Oxon.), 1964; B.C.L. (Oxon.), 1965; Senior Counsel to the
League for Human Rights of B'nai B'rith Canada.
1. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET NO. 32, Vio-
LATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING
REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILI-
TIES FOR THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919 [hereinafter REPORT]. The Report states
that the massacres of Armenians by the Turks was systematically organized with Ger-
man complicity. In addition, it states that more than 200,000 Armenians were killed
between 1914 and 1918. Id. Annex I, at 30.
2. See R. Conot, JUSTICE AT NUREMBURG xii (1983).
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to crimes against humanity during World War I and World
War II. Part II considers the various sources of international
law that recognized crimes against humanity prior to World
War I. In Part III, this Article examines Canada's assertion of
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. This Article con-
cludes that those who have committed crimes against humanity
during World War II must be punished in order to deter the
commission of crimes against humanity in the future.
I. LEGAL RESPONSES TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
A. World War I.- Treaty of Sevres
During World War I, on May 28, 1915, Britain, France,
and Russia charged the Ottoman government with massacres
of Armenians and declared that they would hold responsible
all the members of the Turkish government as well as those
officials who had participated in the massacre.3
After World War I, the Allies began making plans to fol-
low up on that commitment. At the second plenary session of
the Paris Peace Conference, held on January 25, 1919, the
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties (the "Commission of Fif-
teen") was appointed to inquire into and report upon the vio-
lations of international law committed by Germany and its al-
lies during the course of the war.4 Having been unable to
3. Armenian Memorandum presented by the Greek delegation to the Commis-
sion of Fifteen of March 14, 1919, reprinted in Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 1946
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 181 [hereinafter Schwelb].
4. See REPORT, supra note 1, Introductory Note by James Brown Scott, technical
delegate of the United States; see also B. FERENcZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 169 (1980). The Commission of Fifteen was
charged to inquire into and report upon the following points:
1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.
2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the
forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the
air during the present war.
3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular
members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs,
and other individuals, however highly placed.
4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of
these offences.
5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in
the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and
relevant to take into consideration.
1989-1990]
88 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:86
reach conclusions acceptable to all of its members on all sub-
jects submitted to its consideration, the Commission of Fifteen
presented a report on March 29, 1919 (the "Report") and in-
cluded therein the dissenting reports of the U.S. and Japanese
members.-
In the Report, the Commission of Fifteen concluded that
the enemy powers had carried on the war by barbarous or ille-
gitimate methods in violation of the elementary laws of human-
ity. 6 The Report stated that all persons belonging to enemy
countries who had committed offenses against the laws of hu-
manity were subject to criminal prosecution.7
An annex of the Report contained a summary table of of-
fenses committed by the enemy powers during the war.8 In
Id. at 1.
5. See REPORT, supra note 1, Introductory Note by James Brown Scott, technical
delegate of the United States.
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 20.
8. Id. Annex I, at 28.
The non-exhaustive list enumerates the following offenses:
1. Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism;
2. Putting hostages to death;
3. Torture of civilians;
4. Deliberate starvation of civilians;
5. Rape;
6. Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitu-
tion;
7. Deportation of civilians;
8. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions;
9. Forced labour of civilians in connection with the military operations
of the enemy, and otherwise;
10. Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation;
11. Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occu-
pied territory;
12. Attempts to denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory;
13. Pillage;
14. Confiscation of property;
15. Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and requisi-
tions;
16. Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency;
17. Imposition of collective penalties;
18. Wanton devastation and destruction of property;
19. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places;
20. Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and his-
toric buildings and monuments;
21. Destruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without warn-
ing and without provision for the safety of passengers and crew;
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that list were crimes committed by Germany against its allies,
and crimes committed by the Ottoman authorities against its
own citizens. The list also noted the massacre of the Armeni-
ans9 as well as the massacre and expulsion of Greeks from Tur-
key. 10
The U.S. members of the Commission of Fifteen, headed
by Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott, wrote a dissenting
report that focused on the Commission's use of the phrase
"laws of humanity."' 1 The U.S. had not been part of the decla-
ration of intent of May 1915 signed by Britain, France, and
Russia and felt no obligation to honor it. To the U.S. mem-
bers, the phrase "laws of humanity" meant nothing because, as
they argued, there were no such laws."2
The U.S. members argued that "war is by its very nature
inhuman,"13 and any judicial tribunal that would deal with vio-
22. Destruction of fishing boats and of relief ships;
23. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals;
24. Attack on and destruction of hospital ships;
25. Breach of other rules relating to the Red Cross;
26. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases;
27. Use of explosive and expanding bullets, and other inhuman appli-
ances;
28. Directions to give no quarter;
29. Ill-treatment of prisoners of war;
30. Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorised works;
31. Misuse of flags of truce; [and]
32. Poisoning of wells.
Id.
9. Id. Annex I, at 30.
10. Id. Annex I, at 30, 35.
11. Id. Annex II, Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representa-
tives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, April
4, 1919. It was the belief of the U.S. Representatives that the Commission of Fifteen
went beyond the terms of its mandate by declaring that the facts found and the acts
committed were in violation of the laws and of the principles of humanity. See id. at 64
(emphasis added). The U.S. Representatives, therefore, objected to the references in
the report to the laws and principles of humanity in the context of what they believed
was meant to be ajudicial proceeding, as, in their opinion, the facts found were to be
violations or breaches of the laws and customs of war. Id.
12. In the early meetings of the Commission of Fifteen, the U.S. members de-
clared that there were two classes of responsibilities-those of a legal nature and
those of a moral nature. The U.S. members further asserted that although legal of-
fenses were justiciable and subject to trial and punishment by appropriate tribunals,
moral offenses, however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their re-
sults, were beyond the reach of judicial procedure and subject only to moral sanc-
tions. See id. Annex II, at 58-59.
13. Id. Annex II, at 73.
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lations of existing law committed during World War I must
leave to another forum infractions of moral law. 4 To the U.S.
members, the laws of humanity were notions of morality, not
legal norms. Moreover, the concept of laws of humanity was
too vague to have the character of law. 5 The dissenting U.S.
members argued that there was no fixed and universal stan-
dard of humanity; rather, the standards of humanity varied ac-
cording to place and circumstances.' 6 If put before a court,
the application of such standards might reflect only the con-
science of the individual judge.' 7
As a result of the disagreement among the Commission of
Fifteen, the main peace treaty following World War I, the
Treaty of Versailles, contained nothing about crimes against
humanity. 8 Because the Allies could not agree on whether to
include language creating liability for such acts, the matter was
dropped.
The Treaty of Sivres (the "Treaty") was different.' 9 That
Treaty was the peace treaty with Turkey alone, to which the
United States notably was not a party.2 ° The Allies who did
join that Treaty insisted that language imposing liability for
crimes against humanity be included. 2' The Treaty, signed
August 10, 1920, committed the Turkish government to hand
over to the Allied Powers the persons who might have been
responible for the massacres committed during the war on
Turkish territory. The Allied Powers reserved the right to
designate the tribunal that would try the accused. 2' The Turk-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Treaty of Versailles,June 28, 1919, 13 AM.J. INT'L L. Supp. 151, 16 AM.
J. INT'L L. Supp. 207, U.K.T.S. No. 4 (1919) (Cmd. 153), 3 Malloy 3329, 2 Bevans 43.
19. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at S~vres, August 10, 1920, U.K.T.S.
No. 11 (1920) [hereinafter Treaty of S vres].
20. The following powers were party to the Treaty of Svres: The British Em-
pire, France, Italy, and Japan (these four were described in the Treaty of S¢vres as
the Principle Allied Powers) and Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Por-
tugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey. See id.
Preamble, at 4-6.
21. See Schwelb, supra note 3, at 181-82.
22. Treaty of S~vres, supra note 19, art. 230, U.K.T.S. No. 11 (1920) at 51.
23. Id.
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ish government undertook to recognize the tribunal.24 The
Treaty also provided that in the event the League of Nations
created a tribunal competent to deal with the massacres, the
Allied Powers reserved the right to bring the accused before
such tribunal.2 5 The Turkish government undertook equally
to recognize that tribunal.26
The Treaty has four distinguishing features. First, the
terms "crimes against humanity" and "laws of humanity" are
not used. The Treaty assumes that there is an offense for
which the perpetrators of the Armenian massacre would be
tried. But it does not state what is the offense.27
Second, the Treaty established no specific mechanism for
judging the accused, although the Treaty was signed two years
after the war ended. A League of Nations tribunal was con-
templated as a possibility.28
Third, the Treaty of S~vres limits itself to massacres com-
mitted during the continuance of the war. Any atrocities com-
mitted before the war are outside the scope of the Treaty.2 °
Fourth, the jurisdiction of a tribunal to judge the crimes is
not tacitly assumed; instead, there is a specific provision for it.
The Treaty specifically provides that Turkey undertakes to rec-
ognize a tribunal designated to try the accused.30 The implica-
tion is that, without the undertaking, Turkey would be under
no obligation to submit to jurisdiction.
Although the Treaty of Sbvres envisioned the prosecution
of those responsible for the war atrocities, the Allies never did
designate a tribunal to try those accused of the Armenian mas-
sacres. Nor did the League of Nations create a tribunal compe-
tent to deal with the massacres. More important, however, the
Treaty was never ratified, and it never came into force.3 '
There was eventually a peace treaty with Turkey that came
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Under the terms of the Treaty of S~vres, the Turkish Government agreed to
hand over to the Allied Powers all persons accused of having committed an act in
violation of the laws and customs of war. See Treaty of S~vres, supra note 19, art. 226,
U.K.T.S. No. 11 (1920), at 51.
28. Id. art. 230, U.K.T.S. No. 11 (1920), at 51.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Schwelb, supra note 3, at 182.
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into force. This was not the Treaty of Sevres, but the Treaty of
Lausanne of 1923.32 This Treaty was silent on the matter of
crimes against humanity. Accompanying the Treaty of Lau-
sanne was a Declaration of Amnesty for all offenses committed
between 1914 and 1922. 33 The very fact there was an amnesty
provision implied that there were offenses to be amnestied.
But that is as far as the Treaty of Lausanne and Declaration of
Amnesty went. They did not state exactly what offenses were
being amnestied.34
B. World War H. Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal
That is where matters sat until after World War II and the
establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal (the "Tribunal").3 5
But that is not all that can be said about the existence of crimes
against humanity before World War II. The Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal (the "Charter" or the "1945 Charter"),
which empowers the Tribunal to try crimes against humanity,
defines them as "inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war."36 According to the
Charter, an act did not have to be committed during the war to
be a crime against humanity. 7
The Charter also required that the crime have been com-
32. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and Other Instruments, signed at Lausanne,
July 24, 1923, together with Agreements between Greece and Turkey signed on Jan-
uary 30, 1923, and Subsidiary Documents forming part of The Turkish Peace Settle-
ment, U.K.T.S. No. 16 (1923) (Cmd. 1929) [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne].
33. Id. part VIII, at 191-95.
34. Id. part VIII, § III, at 193. The Treaty of Lausanne provided that "[flull and
complete amnesty shall be respectively granted by the Turkish Government and by
the Greek Government for all crimes or offences committed during the same period
which were evidently connected with the political events which have taken place dur-
ing that period." d.
35. Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (1951) [hereinafter London
Agreement].
36. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546,
82 U.N.T.S. 284 (hereinafter Charter). The Charter defines "crimes against human-
ity" as follows: "namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated." Id. art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
37. Id.
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mitted "in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."' 38 The other crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal were war crimes 39 and crimes.
against peace.40 It is theoretically possible that a crime against
humanity could be committed before the war and still be com-
mitted in connection with a war crime or a crime against peace.
However, practically, very few crimes against humanity would
meet that description.
In fact, there were some accused at Nuremberg who were.
also convicted of crimes against humanity committed before
World War II.41 There was the case of Streicher for crimes
against Jews and humanity.42 There was also the case of Von
Schirach and Seyss-Inquart, convicted for crimes against hu-
manity committed in connection with the annexation of Aus-
tria, itself a crime against peace.43 There was also the case of
Frick and Von Neurath, convicted of crimes against humanity
committed in Czechoslovakia. 44 However, no Nuremberg de-
fendant was convicted only of crimes against humanity com-
mitted before the war began.
The Nuremberg Tribunal stated that "[t]he Charter is not
an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious Na-
tions, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the
expression of international law existing at the time of its crea-
tion." 45 In particular, the Tribunal viewed the power to punish
crimes against humanity committed before World War II as an
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 6(b), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. The Charter defines "war
crimes" as follows: "namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violation
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos-
tages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." Id.
40. Id. art. 6(a), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. The Charter defines
"crimes against peace" as follows: "namely, planning, preparation, initiation or wag-
ing of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing." Id.
41. Schwelb, supra note 3, at 205.
42. International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, Oct. 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT'L
L. 172, 293-96 (Judgment and Sentences) (1947).
43. Idat 309-11, 318-21.
44. Id at 291-93, 324-26.
45. Id. at 216.
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expression of international law as it existed on August 8, 1945,
the date of the Charter.4 6
One year later, in 1946, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted without dissent a resolution in which it reaf-
firmed the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the
Tribunal.47 In particular, it can be said that the General As-
sembly reaffirmed the principle that crimes against humanity
were crimes at international law before World War II. 4a
II. RECOGNITION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
If crimes against humanity were crimes at international
law before World War II, what was the source of this interna-
tional law? The Statute of the International Court of Justice
(the "ICJ" Statute) sets out five sources: treaties, customs, ju-
dicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.49
A. Treaties
Before World War II, there was very little in treaty law
about crimes against humanity. The First Hague Convention
of 1907, concerning the laws and customs of war on land, in its
preamble stated that "the inhabitants and the belligerents shall
remain under the protection of and subject to the principles of
the laws of nations, as established by the usages prevailing
among civilized nations, by the laws of humanity and by the
demands of public conscience." 5 ° In addition, there was the
Treaty of S~vres, but as stated earlier, it was never ratified. 5'
After World War II came the London Agreement of Au-
gust 8, 1945 between the United States, France, the United
46. Id.
47. G.A. Res. 95 (1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); see 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 582 (H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1952).
48. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
49. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 995, at 25, 30 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
50. Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting Law of War on Land, Oct. 10, 1908,
Preamble, 36 U.S.T. 860, T.S. No. 9.
51. Schwelb, supra note 3, at 182.
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Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, to which the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal was annexed. It provided that any mem-
ber of the United Nations may adhere to the Agreement.52
Nineteen governments availed themselves of the opportu-
nity. 53 The twenty-three states party to the London Agree-
ment can be taken to have accepted, by treaty, that crimes
against humanity were crimes at international law before
World War 1I. 51
B. Custom
Custom, as a source of international law, is defined as a
general practice that is accepted as law.55 One cannot say that
before World War II there was a general practice, accepted as
law, of prosecuting persons for crimes against humanity. On
the contrary, crimes against humanity were not prosecuted at
all.
However, after World War II, the custom reversed itself.
There developed a practice, at the war crimes trials, of prose-
cuting those who committed crimes against humanity before
World War II. That practice was accepted as law, as witnessed
by the statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the United
Nations General Assembly resolution.56
There are two comments to be made about the custom
that developed. First, the custom was limited to crimes com-
mitted in execution of or in connection with war crimes or
crimes against peace. Even the Treaty of S~vres referred only
to crimes committed during World War I5 There was noth-
ing to indicate, either in custom before World War II, or as it
developed later, that crimes against humanity committed with-
52. See London Agreement, supra note 35, art. 5, 59 Stat. 1544, 1545, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 282.
53. See London Agreement, supra note 35, 82 U.N.T.S. at 280 n. 1. The nineteen
governments that adhered to the London Agreement were: Australia, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia. Id.
54. In addition to the nineteen governments that adhered to the London Agree-
ment, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States were
signatories. Id.
55. ICJ Statute, supra note 49, art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1060, T.S. No. 995 at 30.
56. See supra notes 45, 47.
57. See Treaty of S~vres, supra note 19, art. 230, U.K.T.S. No. 11 (1920), at 51.
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out connection with war crimes or crimes against peace were
crimes at international law.
Second, the development was retrospective. After the
war, nations viewed certain acts before the war as crimes
against humanity. Custom alone, however, did not provide the
legal basis for such prosecutions where the acts in question
were not recognized as crimes before World War II.
C. Judicial Decisions
There are also judicial decisions, another subsidiary
source of international law, that indicate that certain acts or
omissions constitute crimes against humanity. For example, in
the Corfu Channel Case,58 the International Court of Justice
stated that the obligations of Albania to notify others of a mine
field in its waters was based on certain general and well recog-
nized principles. One of these principles was "elementary con-
siderations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in
war."59
D. Qualified Publicists
It should be recognized that a number of the "most highly
qualified publicists "-yet another source of international law-
viewed crimes against humanity as an expression of the gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations. For in-
stance, Lord Wright answered the objection of the U.S. mem-
bers who dissented in the Report of the Commission of Fifteen
on the ground that the doctrine of crimes against humanity
was too uncertain a concept.60 Wright wrote that it might
equally be said that equity or negligence are too indeterminate
to constitute legal concepts, but we well know they have estab-
lished themselves as regular components of our legal system.6'
He added, "If these elastic standards are of as wide utility as
they have proved to be there is no reason why the doctrine of
crimes against humanity should not be equally valid and valua-
ble in International Law." 62
58. Corfu Channel Case (Albania v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
59. Id. at 22.
60. Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, L.Q. REV. 40 (1946).
61. Id. at 48-49.
62. Id. at 49.
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Egon Schwelb, another writer, wrote that under the 1945
Charter, crimes against humanity is a technical term.63 He said
"to come under the notion, a certain act must be universally
recognized as a crime under the penal law of civilized na-
tions." 64 Schwelb was taking up the point Wright had raised,
that it was possible to give content and certainty to the notion
of crimes against humanity. Schwelb's argument not only
gives the notion of crimes against humanity certainty, it gives it
legal stature as well.
Similarly, Hersh Lauterpacht was concerned by this issue.
He wrote that the 1945 Charter presented no innovation when
it decreed individual responsibility for crimes against human-
ity.65 He added, "[f]or the laws of humanity, which are not de-
pendent upon positive enactment, are binding, by their very
nature, upon human beings as such."66
E. General Principles
Finally, the ICJ Statute cites to general principles as a
source of international law. International agreements relating
to crimes against humanity refer specifically to general princi-
ples in their texts.6 7 This vital source of international law has
been relied upon although exact definition of the term "gen-
eral principles of international law" has been subject to de-
bate.
1. International Agreements and
General Principles of Law
Before discussing the controversy surrounding the exact
definition of the term "general principles of international law,"
those international agreements citing general principles
should be examined. Although the Charter of the Nuremburg
Tribunal applied to acts committed before adoption of the
Charter, the Charter did not create a new crime. Rather, the
Charter merely articulated an existing crime. The point is
made by both the European Convention on Human Rights (the
63. Schwelb, supra note 3, at 180.
64. Id. at 197.
65. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 341 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed 1955).
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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"European Convention") 68 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the "International Covenant")69
through the invocation of general principles that recognize
certain acts committed before the adoption of either instru-
ment as crimes against humanity. Both the European Conven-
tion and the International Covenant, however, prohibit retro-
active punishment for an act which was not an offense under
national or international law at the time it was committed.70
Both instruments add that the prohibition shall not prevent
punishment for an act which, at the time it was committed, was
criminal according to general principles of law.71 The Euro-
pean Convention defines general principles of law as those rec-
ognized by civilized nations 72 whereas the International Cove-
nant refers to general principles of law as those recognized by
the community of nations.73
The travaux priparatoires of these instruments show that the
drafters had prepared these provisions with the World War II
crimes specifically in mind.7 ' The summary records of the
Third Committee of the General Assembly showed that state
representatives, when discussing this language of the Interna-
tional Covenant, expressed the view that it would eliminate any
doubts regarding the legality of the judgment rendered at Nu-
remberg.7 5
Because general principles of law are recognized as a
source of international law, it may seem superfluous to have
added this express saving provision in the European Conven-
68. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinaf-
ter European Convention].
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 [hereinafter International Cove-
nant].
70. See European Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; In-
ternational Covenant, supra note 69, art. 15(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
71. See European Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230, In-
ternational Covenant, supra note 69, art. 15(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
72. European Convention, supra note 68, art. 7(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
73. See International Covenant, supra note 69, art. 15(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
74. See Commission on Human Rights, A/2929 ch. VI, § 96, reprinted in Bossuyr,
GuIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PR PARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 330 (1987).
75. See Third Committee, 15th Session (1960), A/4625, § 16, reprinted in Bos-
suvT, supra note 74, at 331-32.
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tion and the International Covenant. Indeed, that was a point
of view expressed by some state representatives, when the in-
ternational instruments were drafted.76 However, to make
matters perfectly clear that the judgments at Nuremberg were
valid, the separate saving provision was added.
The International Covenant provision does not refer only
to crimes against humanity punished at Nuremberg; instead, it
refers to all the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations.7 7 In particular, Nuremberg limited
crimes against humanity to those committed in execution of or
in connection with crimes against peace or war crimes. One
can say, with relative certainty, because of Nuremberg and the
United Nations General Assembly affirming resolution, that
those crimes were crimes according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of nations. But what about
crimes against humanity committed before World War II but
not in execution of or in connection with crimes against peace
or war crimes? Are they also criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations?
Deciding what is criminal according to the general princi-
ples of law recognized by the community of nations is a com-
parative law undertaking.7" This leads to the conclusion that
deciding what was criminal before World War II adds a histori-
cal dimension to such an undertaking.
While for some crimes, that sort of study might be an ar-
duous and prolonged task, for crimes against humanity, it is
immediately obvious what that study should yield. Before
World War II, the community of nations generally recognized
as criminal acts: "murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population . . . [and] persecutions on political, racial or reli-
gious grounds.79
76. See Commission on Human Rights, A/2929, chap. VI, § 96, reprinted in Bos-
suYT, supra note 74, at 330.
77. International Covenant, supra note 69, art. 15(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
78. See Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations (1957), 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 734; see also Schwarzenberger, Foreword to B.
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS xii (1987).
79. See Charter, supra note 36, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284,
1989-19901
100 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 13:86
2. The Meaning of General Principles of Law
The notion that crimes against humanity were crimes at
international law before World War II is superficially puzzling
because the international legal literature at the time contained
no such statement of a crime. Part of the explanation for such
confusion was uncertainty at the time as to whether general
principles of law were part of international law and what the
phrase "general principles of law" meant.
The debate over whether general principles of law were
part of international law was not authoritatively resolved until
1945 when the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") was
established.80 The statute pursuant to which the ICJ was cre-
ated included general principles of law as a source on which
the court could draw.8 ' Hersh Lauterpacht has written that the
inclusion of general principles as a source of international law
in the statute of the court was an important landmark in inter-
national law.8 2
The debate over what "general principles" means has sub-
sided. Some writers, such as Grigory I. Tunkin of the Soviet
Union, have taken the point of view that general principles of
law means general principles of international law.8 3 The pre-
vailing opinion is, nonetheless, that general principles of law
means general principles of municipal law. That, for instance,
is the position accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada.84
Indeed, the Tunkin position would make the general principles
superfluous as a source of law, for general principles of inter-
national law are already conventional or customary interna-
tional law.
Another explanation for the ambiguity surrounding gen-
eral principles of law is that no procedure existed before
World War II to prosecute and punish crimes against human-
ity. Not only was there no international procedure, but neither
was there a domestic procedure in any state for the prosecu-
tion of such crimes. Although the punishment of the crimes
80. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96.
81. See ICJ Statute, supra note 49, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 995, at
25, 30.
82. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 65, at 29-30.
83. Tunkin, Co-Existence and International Law, 95 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1958).
84. In the Matter of Section 55 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, ch. S-19,
as amended, 1 S.C.R. 86, 114 (1984).
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may have been unprecedented until the Nuremburg Tribunal,
the absence of a procedure to punish a crime does not mean
that the crime does not exist. It is understandable, however,
that there was no reference before World War II to crimes
against humanity, when such crimes were not being prose-
cuted at the time.
Unlike the ICJ, the Nuremburg Tribunal was not given the
authority to apply general principles of law. The authority of
the Nuremburg Tribunal was specific and limited to war
crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. 5
It is unlikely that any tribunal will be given the power to
punish international crimes without specifying what those
crimes are. When a tribunal is given power to punish crimes
against humanity, crimes against humanity are specifically
mentioned. General principles of law are not to determine the
content of the crime, but only to determine whether the pun-
ishment of the crime is justifiable.
III. CANADIAN ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION OVER
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
An example of a tribunal given power to punish crimes
against humanity can be found in Canada, where Canadian law
allows for the assertion of jurisdiction over such international
crimes. s' The act must be criminal according to conventional
or customary international law or criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of na-
tions at the time it was committed."7 There must also have
been jurisdiction, at international law, over the crime at the
time it was committed. 8 General principles, however, do not
define the elements of the crime. Canada has specifically legis-
lated the definition of "crime against humanity."8 9
85. Charter, supra note 36, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288.
86. 1987 Can. Stat. ch. 37, § I(1).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. § i(1). Under Canadian law, "crime against humanity" means:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other
inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population
or any identifiable group of persons, whether or not it constitutes a contra-
vention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission,
and that, at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of cus-
tomary international law or conventional international law or is criminal ac-
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The Canadian law contains a legal curiosity that is unlikely
to be found anywhere else. It not only requires that the acts be
crimes at international law when committed, so that the princi-
ple against retroactivity will not be violated;90 it also requires,
for no apparent reason, that there be jurisdiction at interna-
tional law when the act is committed." The principle against
retroactivity dictates that a person not be punished for an act
that was not an offense at the time committed. Moreover, the
principle against retroactivity does not require that a person
who commits a crime, at a place where it was a crime, be free
from punishment because he managed to escape, at the time,
to a place that then had no jurisdiction over the particular
crime. Yet, in contrast to this principle, that is what Canadian
law requires.
The Canadian law puts the courts back into a historical
legal search not only for the general principles of the commu-
nity of nations, but also for universality of jurisdiction. Cana-
dian courts must ask themselves not only whether crimes
against humanity were criminal according to the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by the community of nations before
World War II, but also whether there was universal jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity before World War II.
The issue of universal jurisdiction is not easily resolved
because there were no prosecutions for crimes against human-
ity before World War II. Although prosecutions after World
War II for crimes against humanity have contained statements
that these crimes were crimes at international law before
World War II, no tribunal has stated that there was universal
jurisdiction over these crimes before World War II.
The issue can, nonetheless, be resolved by resorting to
general rules that were recognized before World War II.
There are two that are relevant here. The first principle is that
a state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed
outside its territory by an alien now within its territory, if the
act is a crime in the place where it was committed, if surrender
of the alien for prosecution in the place where the offense was
cording to the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations.
Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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committed has been offered and remains unaccepted, and if
prosecution is not barred by lapse of time in the place where it
was committed. That principle is set out as part of a Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime presented
by Harvard Law School.92
The second principle is that there is universal jurisdiction
over crimes considered dangerous to and attacks upon interna-
tional order. 93 The nature of the crime justifies the repression
of the crime as a matter of international public policy. Because
today, there is plenty of specific authority now stating that
there is universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity
one may take it a step further and say that there must have
been universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity
before World War II, even before any tribunal was competent
to order punishment for such crimes. Crimes against humanity
were always dangerous to international order. Even before the
concept of crimes against humanity had been articulated, there
existed a right, at international law, of intervention on grounds
of humanity.94 For example, in 1827, England, France, and
Russia intervened to end the atrocities of the Greco-Turkish
war. 95 The battle of Navarino also saw the use of force by the
community of nations in the interest of humanity. 96 Similarly,
there were interventions in 1860 to protect the Christians of
Mount Lebanon,9 7 in 1878 to secure the deliverance of the Bal-
kan states,9 8 and in 1896 following massacres in Armenia and
Crete. 99 Jurists conceded to the intervening states the right to
protect the principles of a common humanity.
92. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, art. 10(a), 29 AM.J.
INT'L L. 439, 440-41 (Supp. 1935).
93. F.A. MANN, The Doctrine ofJurisdiction, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 81
(1973); see I BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 304 (3rd ed.
1983).
94. See FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 287 (4th ed. 1965); see also L. KUPER, THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 19-20 (1981).
95. Treaty for the Pacification of Greece signed London, July 6, 1827, State Pa-
pers 14:632, Martens N.R., 7:282, cited in Catalogue of Treaties 1814-1918, at 26
(1964); see C.M. WOODHOUSE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE 144-49 (1968).
96. See FENWICK, supra note 94, at 287; see also C.M. WOODHOUSE, supra note 95.
97. See FENWICK, supra note 94, at 287.
98. See Hovannisian, The Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1879-1923,
in THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN PERSPECTIVE 22-23 (1986); see also C.M. WOODHOUSE,
supra note 95, at 180-81.
99. See C.M. WOODHOUSE, supra note 95, at 182; Hovannisian, supra note 98, at
24-25; see also FENWICK, supra note 94.
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Accordingly, it is clear not only that Canada can now pros-
ecute crimes against humanity committed before World War II
but also that any state before World War II could have prose-
cuted individuals found in that state for crimes against human-
ity on the basis of universal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Adolf Hitler is reported to have said, "[w]ho does now re-
member the Armenians."' 0 0 Because the perpetrators of the
Armenian genocide were not prosecuted, the Nazi-organized
Holocaust against the Jews became possible. There is a direct
linkage between the failure to prosecute the crimes against hu-
manity before World War II and their commission during
World War II.
This failure did not occur because there was no offense or
because there was no jurisdiction. Both existed, and still the
prosecutions did not occur. This reluctance to act, in spite of
the offense and in spite of the jurisdiction, made the Nazis
more brazen and the Holocaust more likely.
Nothing emboldens a criminal so much as the knowledge
he can get away with the crime. That was the message the fail-
ure to prosecute for the Armenian massacre gave to the Nazis.
We ignore the lesson of the Holocaust at our peril. For unless
we want to repeat the mistakes of history, we must prosecute
Nazi mass murderers in our midst.
100. See C. WALKER, ARMENIA: THE SURVIVAL OF A NATION 362 (1980).
